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RESOLVING TRADE DISPLUTES: 
THE MECHANISMS OF GATT/WTO DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
 
Daniel H. Erskine* 
 
“For where there is an authority, a power on earth from which 
relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is 
excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power.”1  The resident 
earthly power resolving controversies between the many sovereign nations 
preventing the outbreak of war over trade related issues is the World Trade 
Organization's Dispute Settlement Body. Such a Body grew from decades 
of experience, and frustration, about the method of settling international 
conflicts between states about tariff and trade problems.  
This work discusses the historical development of the World Trade 
Organization's dispute resolution system. The first part analyzes a variety 
of agreements, understandings, and proposals entered into and put forward 
during the period of 1947 to 1990. The second part addresses the 
instrument inaugurating the World Trade Organization's current dispute 
settlement procedure, and describes a number of submissions by nations 
for improvements to this dispute resolution mechanism.2  The final section 
concludes the work by providing a few theoretical considerations.  
 
                                                 
* [    ] of Commercial Plant Relocators, Inc. (www.cprglobal.com) an international 
relocation and construction service company. J.D. Suffolk University Law School , B.A. 
Boston College . 
1John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True 
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in Political Writings of John Locke 271 
(David Wootton ed., 1993).  
2 See generally The Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting , TN/DS/M/1 (June 12, 2002); The 
Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/2 (July 3, 2002); The Secretariat, Minutes of 
Meeting , TN/DS/M/3 (Sept. 9, 2002); The Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4 
(Nov. 6, 2002). 
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I. HISTORY 
The initial agreement instituting the protocols known as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade foresaw the resolution of 
disputes by “sympathetic consideration” through the informal means of 
consultation between conflicting contracting parties.3  GATT looked to 
traditional diplomatic methods of conciliation, negotiation, mediation, and 
good offices between states to resolve trade conflicts. Though, serious 
offenses involving nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing under 
the agreement could be referred to the collective body of the contracting 
parties for resolution.4  The collective then investigated the matter and 
rendered suggestions or a ruling on the issue.5  If the infringement upon 
the rights of one party by another is serious, then the collective can 
recommend the injured party suspend concessions and other GATT 
obligations made to the injuring party.6  Yet, if such action were taken, the 
injuring party could give notice within sixty days of its desire to withdraw 
from GATT.7 
The system reflected a traditional approach to international legal 
relations. Nations were sovereign, and as such retrained the freedom from 
imposition of binding collective judgment rendered by an international 
institution. Such an institution was inferior to the nation-state, and 
therefore could not enforce its decree without consent of the sovereign 
                                                 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXII, XXIII:1, 61 Stat. A-
11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See also GATT art. VI:7, XII:4, 
XVI:1, XIX:2, XXVIII (bilateral or multilateral consultations for resolution of restrictive 
trade measures); GATT art. XII:4, XIX:3, XXIV:7, XXIV:10, XXV:5, XXVIII:4 
(multilateral dispute resolution); GATT Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Dispute 
Settlement GATT Dispute Settlement System Note , MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4 (June 5, 
1987). 
4 GATT art. XXIII:2. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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state. Ultimately, this position proved unworkable in the volatile and 
important realm of trade relations.8 
 
A. 1948 Havana Charter 
Noteworthy is the detailed dispute procedures set forth in the 
Havana Charter of 1948. The Charter reflected the first effort to produce a 
sophisticated International Trade Organization governing trading relations 
between member states. Looking to Chapter VIII of the Charter, members 
whose benefits are impaired or nullified may submit written proposals for 
amicable resolution of the injury.9  This is the consultation option.  
Another choice available to disputants is reference to arbitration 
under terms agreed upon by the members.10  The determination of the 
arbitrator binds the parties, but not other members.11  In the event these 
measures fail, any member may refer the matter to the Executive Board, 
which must promptly consider whether a treaty violation occurred.12  The 
board may take delimited action if a violation is found.13  If a serious 
infraction is discovered, the Board “release[s] the Member or Members 
affected from obligations or the grant of concessions to any other Member 
or Members…to the extent and upon such conditions as it considers 
appropriate and compensatory, having regard to the benefit which has 
been nullified or impaired.”14  Any such decision by the Executive Board 
                                                 
8 See Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern 
GATT Legal System 417-585 (Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), for a history of 
disputes and their resolutions. See WTO, 2 Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical 
Index 611-629, 630-787, art. XXII-XXXVIII , (1995) for interpretative history of GATT 
Articles involved in dispute settlement. 
9 Havana Charter for International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, ch. VIII, art. 93(1) 
[Hereinafter Havana Charter]. 
10 Id. at art. 93(2). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at art. 94. 
13 Id. at art. 94(2)(a)-(e). 
14 Id. at art. 94(3). 
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can be appealed to the Conference for confirmation, modification, or 
reversal.15 Finally, the opinion of the Conference can be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.16  Such an opinion 
binds the Organization, and modification of an Organization opinion 
results if the Court's ruling negates that of the Organization.17 
The procedures described above were not effective, due to the 
Charter's failed ratification by the requisite number of signatories. Yet, 
GATT dispute resolution evolved under the protocols into the 
implementation of working parties to handle disputes between contracting 
parties as the main form of resolving conflict.18  These working parties 
became panels in 1952.19  Panels were composed of three to five 
independent experts from non-disputant parties.20  
 
B. 1966 Decision 
The Contracting Parties codified procedures for disputes between 
developed and developing countries in 1966.21  If a developing contracting 
party and a developed contracting party could not settle their dispute by 
consultation, the developing country could request the Director-General of 
GATT to act ex officio by good offices to achieve a solution.22  If the 
Director-General fails within two months to effect a solution, either of the 
disputing parties can refer the matter to the Contracting Parties or the 
Council. Either of these bodies then appoints a panel of experts with the 
                                                 
15 Havana Charter art. 95(1). 
16 Id. at art. 96(2). 
17 Id. at art. 96(5). 
18  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Introduction to International Trade Law and the 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction, 34-35 (ed. Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, 1997). 
19 Id. at 35. 
20 Id. 
21 Decision on Procedures under Article XVIII, B.I.S.D. 14S/18 (Apr. 5, 1966) 
[hereinafter Decision on Procedures]. 
22 Id. 
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consent of the disputants to recommend an appropriate solution.23  The 
panel must submit to the Contracting Parties or the Council its 
recommendation within sixty days after appointment, and those bodies 
will then issue a decision upon the recommendation.24  Ninety days after a 
decision is transmitted to the disputants, the party found in breach must 
report on its compliance with the decision.25  If the breaching party is not 
in compliance, the Contracting Parties or the Council may, upon serious 
circumstances, authorize the injured party to suspend any concession or 
obligation.26   
C. 1979 Understanding 
The 1966 Decision was followed in 1979 by a broader 
Understanding articulating procedures for dispute resolution between all 
contracting parties.27  In an Annex to the Understanding, customary GATT 
dispute practice was affirmed and described. Panels review the facts of a 
case, the applicability of GATT protocols to the dispute, and arrive at an 
objective assessment of the matter.28  Panels consult directly with the 
disputants, and allow for mutual solution of the dispute between the 
parties.29  Failure of a panel to reach a “mutually satisfactory settlement” 
usually resulted in referral of the dispute to the Contracting Parties, who in 
turn avail themselves of panels to assist and recommend a ruling under 
GATT Art. XXIII:2.30 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and 
Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907, LT/TR/U/1, (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter GATT 
Understanding] (reaffirming the 1966 procedures as well). 
28 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and 
Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907, LT/TR/U/1, Annex para. 3 (Nov. 28, 1979) 
[hereinafter GATT Understanding Annex]. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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1. Customary GATT Dispute Practices  
Working parties, instituted by the Council at the request of a 
contracting party, establish their own working procedures.31  Such 
working parties meet at least twice to consider the matter, and once to 
discuss conclusions.32  The membership of the party is open to any 
contracting party interested in the dispute, with disputants always 
members of the working party.33  A final report, reached by consensus, is 
reported to the Council as an advisory opinion that the Council adopts.  
Panels, since 1952, are appointed by the contracting parties to 
resolve a dispute under GATT Art. XXVIII:2.34  Disputants propose terms 
of reference to the Council, which are discussed and approved by the 
Council. Members of the panel are normally selected from permanent 
GATT delegations or national administrators involved with GATT 
activities on a regular basis.35  Additionally, members of the panel include 
delegates from developing countries when the dispute involves a 
developed contracting party and a developing party.36  These panel 
members act impartially and independently from their national 
governments. Some panels include non-governmental experts. The GATT 
secretariat receives proposed nominees to the panel by the concerned 
parties, which in turn confirms or denies nominees thereby forming a three 
to five member panel with the consent of the concerned parties.37  The 
panels then act autonomously by setting their own procedures and 
schedule. Additionally, the disputants present either oral or written 
                                                 
31 Id. at para. 6(i). 
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 GATT Understanding Annex para. (6)(ii). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at para. (6)(iii). 
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communications to the panel, and answer questions posed by the panel.38  
Other interested parties may also be heard, and the panel may consult 
outside experts and the secretariat on historical and procedural issues.39  
If no resolution is achieved, a panel sets out its findings of fact, a 
determination of the applicability of GATT provision, and its rationale for 
any recommendations or findings.40  Usually, this report is first given to 
the parties before it is given to the Contracting Parties.41  The scope of 
these reports runs from determination of whether an infringement of 
GATT protocols occurred to technical opinions, but most include 
recommendations to the parties. The report is anonymous and the 
deliberations of the panel secret.42  The process takes about three to nine 
months.43  
 
2. New GATT Procedures for Dispute Settlement  
Reaffirming GATT's commitment to the expeditious resolution of 
conflicts through consultation, the Contracting Parties laid down 
procedures to solve disputes failing to resolve themselves through 
consultation. Underlying the dispute resolution system are the principles 
of conducting the process in good faith and proceedings not being 
contentious.44  First, any one of the disputants may ask either an individual 
or body to exercise good offices with a view toward conciliation.45  In a 
dispute between a developed state and a developing state, the developing 
state may request the GATT Director-General's good offices.46  Second, in 
                                                 
38 Id. at para. (6)(iv). 
39 Id. 
40 GATT Understanding Annex para. (6)(v). 
41 Id. at para. (6)(vii). 
42 Id. at para. (6)(viii). 
43 Id. at para. (6)(ix). 
44 Id. at para. 9. 
45 GATT Understanding para. 8. 
46 Id. 
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the case of failed consultation, a disputant may request the Contracting 
Parties establish a panel or working party.47  The Director-General, after 
agreement with the disputants, proposes the three to five membership of 
the panel for approval of the Contracting Parties.48  The members should 
be governmental, and not citizens of the disputants countries.49  The 
Director-General maintains an informal list comprised of governmental 
and non-governmental individuals qualified in trade relations, economic 
development, and other GATT matters.50  The disputants may raise 
objection to nominees for compelling reasons within seven working 
days.51  Within thirty days after decision of the Contracting Parties the 
panel must be established.52 
Panel members serve neutrally and without instruction from their 
national governments, and should represent a diverse background and 
wide range of experience.53  Any contracting party showing a substantial 
interest in the dispute before the panel has an opportunity to be heard.54  
The panel may seek additional advice from an individual or body on an 
issue pertinent to the dispute, provided notice is given to the disputants if 
either resides in the disputant's nation.55  Disputants have a duty to 
promptly respond to panel requests for information, and confidential 
information is not publicly released unless authorized by the contracting 
party submitting the information.56 
                                                 
47 Id. at para. 10. 
48 Id. at para. 11. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at para. 13. 
51 GATT Understanding para. 12. 
52 Id. at para. 11. 
53 Id. at para. 14. 
54 Id. at para. 15. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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Hence, the panel is to assist the Contracting Parties' function under 
the guise of GATT Art. XXII:2.57  The panel renders an objective decision 
upon the facts, applicability, and conformity of the questioned action with 
GATT protocols.58  Such a decision must be in writing if the disputants 
fail to reach a mutually satisfactory solution of the conflict, and must be 
submitted to the Contracting Parties.59  Similarly, if bilateral settlement of 
the conflict occurs, then a written panel report reflecting the solution and 
description of the case is necessary.60  Such written reports must be 
submitted to the disputants prior to their submission to the Contracting 
Parties.61  The resort to panel process should result in prompt production 
of a decision within a reasonable time, or in urgent circumstances within 
three months after panel constitution.62 
The Contracting Parties equally have a duty to promptly consider 
panel reports and take action if necessary.63  Special consideration is given 
to disputes involving developed and developing countries. In these 
instances, the Contracting Parties meet specially and consider the 
complained of trade measures' coverage, and their impact on the economy 
of the developing country.64  The Parties maintain oversight of compliance 
with their recommendation through surveillance.65  At the request of the 
complaining contracting party, noncompliance by the defendant party with 
the recommendation within a reasonable time may result in the 
                                                 
57 GATT Understanding para. 16. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. Any Contracting Party with an interest in the dispute can enquire and receive 
information about the solution as it relates to trade matters. Id. at para. 19. 
61 Id. at para. 18. 
62 GATT Understanding para. 20. 
63 Id. at para. 21. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at para. 22. 
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Contracting Parties making suitable efforts to provide a solution to the 
situation.66 
The Understanding adopts some of the procedures outlined in the 
Havana Charter, but falls short of creating a legalistic framework for 
dispute resolution. Essentially, the Understanding leaves much to the 
working parties or panels to decide, and provides ratification of these 
actions by review of the Contracting Parties. The Understanding 
represents the first codification of procedural dispute settlement within the 
GATT. The following discussed documents make improvements to the 
1979 Understanding.  
 
D. 1982 Ministerial Declaration 
Emphasizing the use of diplomatic means to resolve conflict 
among the Contracting Parties, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration permits 
disputants to request the good offices of the Director-General or group of 
individuals nominated by the Director upon the failure of consultation.67  
The expeditious process is confidential, positions taken are nonbinding in 
further action, and both parties retain the right to refer the matter to the 
Contracting Parties.68 
Further, the Director-General is responsible to report to the 
Council on any case failing to constitute a panel under the time limits for 
establishment.69  Additionally, the Director compensates experts from 
outside of Geneva serving on the panel, and assists the panel specifically 
on historical, legal, and procedural aspects of the panel process.70 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Decision on Dispute Settlement, at para. i, 29S/13 (Nov. 29, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 
Decision on Dispute Settlement]. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at para. ii. 
70 Id. at paras. iii, iv. 
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Prompt resolution of conflict requires panels to report an inability to meet 
deadlines, and as soon as possible render the report. The panel report 
should make a direct finding on whether or not a nullification or 
impairment of a GATT benefit occurred, and upon making a finding of 
such violation the panel should set out recommendations for resolving the 
matter for the Contracting Parties consideration.71  After a 
recommendation is made by the Contracting parties to the disputants, the 
violating party must report to the Contracting Parties within a reasonable 
time of its compliance or noncompliance with the recommendation stating 
the reasons for such noncompliance.72  In such an instance of 
noncompliance, the Contracting Parties may recommend a compensatory 
adjustment with respect to products or authorize the suspension of 
concessions or obligations.73  Finally, the decision to recommend a 
solution by the Contracting Parties includes the disputants, and consensus 
determines whether recommendation is made.74 
 
E. 1984 Decision 
The 1982 Decision did not quite solve an essential problem with 
the GATT dispute system involving the procedural process of panel work. 
In 1984 the Contracting Parties put forth a set of procedures covering the 
formation of panels and the conduct of their work.75  The chief problem 
encountered by the panel process involved their timely formation and 
completion of their work. Thus, improved procedures were adopted. In the 
formation of a panel the Contracting Parties indicate to the Director-
                                                 
71 Id. at para. v. 
72 Id. at para. viii. 
73 1982 Decision on Dispute Settlement para. ix. 
74 Id. at para. x. 
75 See Decision on Dispute Settlement, L/5718/Rev.1 (Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 
Decision on Dispute Settlement] available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/1984decision.pdf. 
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General the name of individuals not associated with national 
administrations endowed with a high degree of competence in 
international trade and GATT principles, that they believe are qualified to 
serve as panelists.76  These individuals form a roster agreed upon by the 
Contracting Parties.  
The Director-General retains its authority to nominate panel 
members, but may also nominate individuals from the roster, as well as 
governmental individuals.77  Parties may still object to panelists for 
compelling reasons. In the event of disagreement over panel composition 
causing delay of panel establishment within thirty days, the Director-
General, with the consent of the parties and in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Council, completes the panel's constitution by appointing 
panelists from the roster of non-governmental individuals to resolve the 
deadlock.78 
Panels, once established, retain the ability to set their own working 
procedures.79  Though, panels should provide disputants with a proposed 
calendar addressing the panel's work schedule.80  Written submissions, 
requested by the panel, should be received by the panel within the 
deadline set by the panel.81 
These improvements were initially adopted on a trial basis for one 
year, but remained in effect until 1989. The reform of the panel procedure 
might have caused an increase in panel utilization. From 1985 to the end 
of 1989, “governments filed 69 complaints resulting in 27 panel decisions, 
as compared with 46 complaints and 20 panel decisions for the first five 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 1984 Decision on Dispute Settlement. 
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years” of the 1980's.82  The increase in panel use caused another reform of 
the dispute procedures in 1989.  
 
F. 1989 Decision 
Continuing to desire the prompt and effective resolution of conflict 
under GATT, the Contracting Parties improved dispute procedures to an 
extent paralleled to their 1979 Understanding.83  These procedures were to 
remain in effect on a trail basis until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
under the supervision of the Contracting Parties throughout the Round in 
an aim of continued improvement and negotiation over GATT dispute 
resolution procedures.84 
Formal disputes resolved by bilateral negotiation and arbitration 
awards were required to be notified to the Council so any party might raise 
any point regarding such action.85  Other disputes beginning by formal 
request for consultation under GATT Articles XXII:1 or XXIII:1 required 
the contracting party so requested to reply within ten days after receipt of 
the request, and undertake good faith consultations within thirty days of 
the request.86  Failure to follow this procedure grants the requesting party 
authorization to request constitution of a panel or working party.87 
                                                 
82 Hudec, supra note 8, at 199. 
83 See Extension of the April 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/7416 (Feb. 22, 1994). See also Communication from 
Switzerland , MTN.GNG/NG13/W/8 (Sept. 18, 1987) (proposing much of the reforms 
embodied within 1989 improvements). 
84 See Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, 
para. A(1), 36S/61 (Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter GATT Improvements]. Hudec, supra note 
8, at 417-585, for a history of disputes and their resolutions. See 2 Guide to GATT Law 
and Practice Analytical Index, supra note 8, for interpretative history of GATT Articles 
involved in dispute settlement. 
85 GATT Improvements para. B. 
86 Id. at para. C(1) (proposing this time table unless the parties mutually agree to an 
alternate procedure). 
87 Id. 
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The failure of consultations to resolve a dispute within sixty days 
after the request, results in the requesting party's right to seek 
establishment of a panel or working party.88  Additionally, if the parties 
jointly believe the consultations failed, then the requesting party may seek 
a panel or working party remedy within the sixty day period.89  Request 
for consultation must be presented to the Council in writing outlining the 
reasons for the request.90 
Urgent disputes are subject to an expedited schedule. The parties 
must conduct consultations within ten days from the request date.91  If 
after thirty days of the request consultations fail to resolve the dispute, 
then the requesting party may seek panel or working party resolution.92 
Entry into good offices, conciliation, or mediation within sixty 
days of a request for consultation shall continue for a sixty day period 
before the requesting party seeks constitution of a panel or working 
party.93  Yet, if both parties agree within the sixty day period that the 
conciliation, mediation, or good offices have failed, then the requesting 
party may ask for a panel or working party.94  Resort to the Director-
General's good offices, conciliation, or mediation is also available to the 
disputants.95 
Another dispute remedy available to the disputants is arbitration. 
Disputants with clearly defined issues may, by mutual agreement on 
                                                 
88 Id. at para. C(2). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at para. C(3). 
91 GATT Improvements para. C(4) (including as an example of “urgent situation,” 
disputes involving perishable goods). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at para. D(1) (allocating no time requirements upon completion of purely 
diplomatic means of resolving dispute). 
94 Id. (explaining that conciliation, mediation, and good offices may continue during 
panel and working party deliberations). 
95 Id. at para. D(3). 
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process, contract to settle conflict by binding arbitration.96  Other parties 
may join the agreement to arbitrate, provided they agree to be bound by 
the award.97 
Request for panel or working group process must be in writing, 
indicating whether consultations were held, provide a summary of the 
facts and legal basis of the dispute, as well as articulate terms of 
reference.98  Standard terms of reference govern a dispute, unless 
otherwise agreed by the disputants within twenty days of the dispute.99 A 
request for a panel or working group is considered at the latest Council 
meeting following the request, unless the Council decides otherwise.100  In 
deciding to establish a panel the Council may authorize its Chairman to 
create the terms of reference for a panel in consultation with the parties, 
and circulate the terms to the Council for their comments.[101 
Panels are composed of three members, unless the disputants agree 
within ten days of the decision to establish a five-member panel.102  
Panelists are drawn from representatives of the Contracting Parties and an 
improved and expanded non-governmental list of individuals with 
knowledge of international trade and GATT principles.103  Upon the 
failure to agree on panelists within twenty days of the decision to 
                                                 
96 Id. at para. E(1)-(3) (requiring disputants to notify all Contracting Parties before 
beginning proceedings). 
97 GATT Improvements para. E(3). 
98 Special terms of reference must be accompanied by proposed text. Id. at para. F(a). 
99 Id. at para. F(b)(1). The standard terms of reference are: “To examine, in the light of 
the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by 
(name of contracting party) in document L/... and to make such findings as will assist the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in Article XXIII:2.” Id. 
100 Id. at para. F(b)(2). 
101 Id. 
102 GATT Improvements para. F(c)(4). 
103 Id. at para. F(c)(1)-(3). 
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constitute a panel, either disputant may request the Director-General, in 
consultation with the Chairman of the Council, to appoint panelists.104 
Multiple complaints, occurring when more then one contracting 
party requests a panel, will be dealt with under a single panel whenever 
feasible.105  The single panel conducts its proceedings and findings in a 
manner not impairing the rights of the several parties.106  Upon the request 
of one disputant, the panel renders separate reports on each separate 
dispute.107  Every disputant obtains the complaints and written 
submissions of the other disputants, and possesses a right of presence at 
the oral submissions of other parties to the panel.108 
Within one week of a panel's constitution, panelists should fix the 
timetable for the process at least to the first substantive meeting.109  The 
entire process should not exceed six months in duration, and may be 
expedited in cases of urgency to three months.110  If a panel is unable to 
complete the process within the appropriate time, then it must 
communicate in writing to the Council detailing its reason for delay and an 
estimate on the amount of time necessary to complete the panel's work.111  
                                                 
104 Id. at para. F(c)(5) (requiring the Director-General to inform parties of composition of 
the panel within ten days of the request). 
105 Id. at para. F(d)(1). If separate panels are established to review related complaints, 
then the same panelists should sit upon these panels to the greatest extent possible. See id. 
at para. F(d)(3). 
106 Id. at para. F(d)(2). 
107 GATT Improvements para. F(d)(2). 
108 Id. Third Contracting Parties, notifying the Council of their substantial interest in the 
panel proceeding, have the opportunity for oral and written submissions to the panel, and 
access to the written submissions of those disputants agreeing to disclose their 
submissions. Id. at para. F(e)(2),(3) (allowing for disputants' access to third party 
submissions). 
109 Id. at para. F(f)(2). 
110 Id. at para. F(f)(5). 
111 Id. at para. F(f)(6). 
Vol. 2 [2003] RESOLVING TRADE DISPUTES 56 
 Daniel H. Erskine 
 
In any event, the entire panel process can not exceed nine months in 
duration, calculated from the date of panel constitution.112 
Thirty days after submission to the Council of a panel's report, the 
Council takes action upon the report with written objections to the report 
given to the Council ten days before the Council's meeting.113  Decision by 
the Council on a panel report, unless otherwise agreed, shall not exceed 
fifteen months from the date of the establishment of a panel.114  Disputants 
attend Council meetings, and consensus decision governs action on the 
panel report.115 
Compliance with Contracting Parties' rulings or recommendations 
occurs through report to the Council by the disputant found in error.116  
Also, the Council monitors compliance through status reports by the 
contacting party in error until the issue is resolved.117  In disputes 
involving developing nations, the Council retains the authority granted in 
the 1979 Understanding to provide an appropriate remedy.118 
 
G. Birth of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
As the Contracting Parties came together for the Uruguay Round 
of Negotiations, a topic of concern was the GATT dispute settlement 
system. Several countries submitted proposals for improvements of the 
                                                 
112 GATT Improvements para. F(f)(6). These provisions, however are alterable by 
agreement in disputes involving developing nations. Id. at para. F(f)(7). 
113 Id. at para. G(1), (2). 
114 Id. at para. G(4). 
115 Id. at para. G(3). 
116 See id. at para. I(2) (allowing for a reasonable time to comply if immediate 
implementation of a Council recommendation is impracticable). 
117 GATT Improvements para. I(3) (explaining that the issue remains on Council agenda 
six months following ruling, that the issue remains until resolved, and that contracting 
party in error submits status report ten days prior to Council meeting). 
118 Id. at para. I(4). Additionally, developing nations may request legal advice from the 
Secretariat, and the Secretariat makes available a qualified impartial legal expert to any 
developing country. See id. at para. H(1). 
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current system.119  The large number of submissions provided the 
negotiating group ample fodder for analysis and discussion of the GATT 
dispute settlement system.  
Most submissions offered differing views of dispute settlement 
within the GATT. Among these were a system emphasizing choice by 
disputants of “alternative and complementary techniques” permitting 
flexible response to conflicts.120  Juxtaposed to the previous submission 
were others adopting a rule-oriented method creating legally binding 
adjudications through a sequential approach providing speed and 
incentives for compliance with Contracting Parties recommendations 
through institutional devices.121 Still others saw GATT dispute settlement 
as a process protecting Contracting Parties' rights, while promoting 
“security and predictability in the multilateral trading system.”122  Another 
expressed view emphasized negotiated solution over panel process.123 
The United States, supported by Canada, urged improvement in the 
dispute settlement process regarding its aims. The United States desired a 
system of GATT dispute settlement that adjudged through legal judgment 
                                                 
119 See GATT Secretariat, Meeting of 2 and 3 March 1988 , MTN.GNG/NG13/6 (Mar. 
31, 1988). Written submissions were given by “Mexico (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/1), New 
Zealand (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/2), the United States (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/3 and 6), 
Jamaica (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/5), Japan (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/7, 9 and 21), Switzerland 
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/8), the Nordic countries (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/10), Australia 
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/11), the European Communities (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/12 and 22), 
Canada (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/13), Nicaragua (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/15), Argentina 
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/17), Hungary (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/18), Korea 
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/19), Peru (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/23), [and] a joint submission by 
Argentina, Canada Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico and Uruguay 
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/16).” Id. 
120 GATT Secretariat, Summary and Comparative Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations 
, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14 (Nov. 3, 1987) [hereinafter GATT Summary and Comparative 
Analysis Nov. 3, 1987]. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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whether a party's action was right or wrong.124  The losing party, then, 
ought to comply with the judgment rendered.125  On the other hand, the 
European Communities and Japan saw the aim of GATT dispute 
settlement to overcome the particular trade problem, not render legal 
judgment.126 GATT rules, under this view, became secondary references 
subsumed by practical economic, social, or political rationales dictating 
nonconformity with GATT rules.127  GATT rules' interpretation lied 
within the collective consideration of the Contracting Parties application 
of it to the particular situation presented.128 
In the area of notification, parties articulated a need for prompt 
notice before trade measure implementation, in order to effectuate earlier 
consultations to avoid disputes.129  Indeed, one proposal sought refusal of 
party requests under GATT Art. XXIII:2 if prior bilateral negotiations 
were not held.130  Another party suggested no party should refuse a request 
for consultations under GATT Art. XXII.131 
Looking to diplomatic measures to resolve conflict, some parties 
urged mandatory resort to conciliation or mediation as the initial step in 
GATT dispute settlement.132  Others argued for mutually agreed mediation 
voluntarily entered into as an alternative option to consultations.133  One 
party recommended specific procedures for conciliation, in which the 
conciliator adjudged if nullification or impairment of a GATT benefit 
                                                 
124 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round 
125 (Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 GATT Secretariat, Summary and Comparative Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations, 
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 1988) [hereinafter GATT Summary and 
Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988]. 
130 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Nov. 3, 1987, supra note 120. 
131 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129. 
132 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Nov. 3, 1987, supra note 120. 
133 Id. 
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occurred, as well as suggested compensation for conduct found in breach 
of GATT protocols.134  Others proposed failed consultations should 
proceed to good offices by another contracting party, the Chairman of the 
Council, or the Director-General.135  Some offered a scheme distinctly 
separating mediation from the panel process, while another authorized 
panels to “suggest conciliation proposals even if not necessarily based on 
provisions of [GATT].”136  Another proposal sanctioned resort to 
mediation during panel process, as well as when bilateral consultations 
failed.137 
Assessing the role of the GATT Council, the United States 
addressed the requirement of consensus decision-making seeking greater 
restrictions upon veto power. The proposal sought to grant the 
complainant an automatic right to have a panel appointed on demand, and 
to establish a rule eliminating disputants from Council decisions to adopt 
rulings on the panel report or to authorize retaliation.138  The United States 
urged that Council decisions be binding upon disputants.139 
Hungary proposed the Council divide decision on a panel report 
into: (1) decision on acceptance of the legal judgment of the panel in 
which all Contracting Parties participated; and (2) decision on the panel's 
recommendations for resolution of the dispute, excluding the disputants.140  
Another saw the Council meeting four times yearly on a regular basis to 
monitor all ongoing dispute proceedings to ensure compliance with panel 
                                                 
134 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Croome, supra note 124, at 125 (proposing to exclude disputants from Council 
decision referred to as “consensus-minus-two”); GATT B.I.S.D. (36 th Supp.) at 61-67 
(1990). 
139 Croome, supra note 124, at 125. 
140 Id. at 126. 
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recommendations.141 In such special meetings one proposed an elected or 
appointed chairman could preside over the “Dispute Settlement Council,” 
and convene consultations or conduct conciliation to resolve a dispute.142  
Opponents of this plan pointed to the great amount of disputes involving 
developed countries as a disincentive for developing countries to attend 
meetings of the Dispute Settlement Council, but believed a deputy 
chairman could preside over such a special Council meeting if one were 
established.143 
One scheme constructed a distinct GATT dispute settlement body, 
which reported to the Council and monitored the implementation of 
recommendations.144  Another proposal suggested the Council resolve 
some evident cases on its own without the panel process.145  
Relating to panel procedures, the United States proposal urged that 
panelist be chosen mostly from non-governmental individuals to ensure 
greater public confidence in panel proceedings.146  Brazil put forth a 
proposal granting developing countries greater favorable treatment in 
panel cases in an effort to provide such countries with “a higher level of 
equity.”147  Other recommendations insisted on standardized procedures 
for the panel process.148  Some Contracting Parties asked for panel 
authority for an “interim measure of protection” in the case of urgent 
                                                 
141 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposal for Improvements in the GATT Dispute Settlement 
System A Survey and Comparative Analysis , in Foreign Trade in the Present and a New 
International Economic Order 355 (Detlve Dicke & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988). 
146 Croome, supra note 124, at 124. 
147 Id. at 126. 
148 Petersmann, supra note 145, at 364. See GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis 
Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129 (discussing how other proposals sought bilaterally agreed 
and grey area trade restrictions be subject to GATT dispute settlement procedures). 
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disputes involving perishable goods.149 One party suggested binding time 
tables for each aspect of the panel process with unagreed delays 
authorizing a party to retaliate for damage caused by the disputed measure 
during the delay upon a finding the measure violated GATT protocols.150  
Others desired the Contracting Parties review each request for a panel to 
determine its relevance, “the appropriateness of continuing or resuming 
bilateral consultations as well as the appropriate method of dispute 
settlement before deciding” whether or not to establish a panel.151  
Bangladesh proposed adoption of advantageous special dispute procedures 
applicable to least-developed countries.152 
The European Communities proposed a ban on unilateral action by 
any contracting party to remedy a trade dispute, as well as a harmonization 
of municipal law with GATT dispute settlement procedures.153  A 
differing view granted compensation upon the failure of a disputant to 
comply with a recommendation within a reasonable time, and failing to 
compensate authorized use of countermeasures upon the Contracting 
Parties' approval.154  Other suggestions focused on the Council's ability to 
monitor compliance with recommendations by requiring a party in error to 
submit written documentation of compliance, including action taken and 
proposed.155 
Mexico put forth the first comprehensive reform proposal of the 
entire dispute settlement process. Its terms included resort to the Director-
                                                 
149 Petersmann, supra note 145, at 364. 
150 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129. 
151 Petersmann, supra note 145, at 357. But cf. GATT Summary and Comparative 
Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129 (submitting that others believed panels more 
capable of accessing the relevance of a complaint, and proposed automatic constitution of 
a panel without any decision or deliberation by the Council). 
152 Croome, supra note 124, at 227. 
153 Id. at 127. 
154 GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129. 
155 Petersmann, supra note 145, at 369. 
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General if consultation failed within thirty days to mediate or arbitrate, 
meeting of the Council specifically for the purpose of conducting dispute 
settlement procedure activities, and a choice for disputants to be part of 
Council decisions on adoption and enforcement of panel reports.156  
Canada put forth a similar proposal emphasizing strict deadlines for panel 
proceedings, prohibition on disputants blocking consensus adoption of 
panel reports, and detailed provisions for a noncompliant party's 
subjugation to suspension of benefits.157 
Further proposals from the European Communities focused on a 
right to appeal panel decisions to a body of experts.158  Switzerland sought 
consideration, through domestic legislation, of private citizens' and 
corporations' rights in GATT dispute settlement actions.159 
In 1990, the European Communities and the United States put 
forth proposals advocating the establishment of an entirely new dispute 
resolution system for GATT. The proposals were similar in the respect 
that each called for an appellate body to review legal conclusions, and 
authorized compensation and the right to retaliate against noncompliant 
parties.160  The two proposals diverged on the process of deciding 
adoption of panel reports. The European Communities desired consensus 
rule, while the United States urged either consensus decision to adopt the 
report with the losing parties excluded or automatic adoption of a panel 
report if disputants failed to appeal or object.161 
Many Contracting Parties urged codification of GATT dispute 
procedure, and a declaration of commitment to utilize these procedures 
                                                 
156 Croome, supra note 124, at 128. 
157 See id. 
158 Id. at 226. 
159 Id. at 227. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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consistently.162  A “single consolidated text of GATT dispute settlement 
procedures would offer an adequate way of expressing a strengthened 
commitment to abide by the…system.”163 Thus, in 1990 a draft text on 
dispute settlement arose.164 
 
1. 1990 Draft  
Reiterating previous GATT practice, the draft required well-
qualified panelists chosen from governmental and non-governmental 
sources.165  The draft assures a right to panel process, and presents three 
options for final drafters to select. The first option permits establishment 
of a panel at the earliest meeting of the Council upon which the request for 
a panel appears on the agenda.166 A second option provides automatic 
establishment of a panel upon receipt by the Director-General of a panel 
request.167 The third option modifies the first option by granting the 
Council the right to decide upon the establishment of a panel.168 
The draft text modified the panel process by establishing an 
interim review stage resulting ten days after receipt of final submission 
and arguments by disputants.169  In this period the panel submits its report 
to the disputants for their written comments, which are received within ten 
to fifteen days after acquiring the report.170  The panel report consists only 
                                                 
162 Petersmann, supra note 145, at 384. 
163 Id. 
164 Several documents led to the draft text. See generally GATT Meeting Mar. 31, 1988, 
supra note 119; GATT Secretariat, Comparison of Existing Texts and Proposals for 
Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement System, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/29 (Aug. 8, 
1988); GATT Secretariat, Comparison of Existing Texts and Proposals for Improvements 
to the GATT Dispute Settlement System, MTN.GNG/NG13/W29/Rev.1 (Sept. 21, 1988). 
165 GATT Secretariat, Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/45 (Sept. 
21, 1990) [hereinafter GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement]. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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of the panel's description of the dispute, findings, and conclusion, 
excluding the panel's recommendations.171  The panel, upon request of the 
objecting party, conducts a further meeting addressing the objections 
raised in a party's written submission on the panel's report.172  No 
objections being raised, the interim panel report becomes the final panel 
report, and is circulated among the Contracting Parties.173  If however 
objections are made, they shall be articulated in the panel's final report.174  
The draft sets out four options concerning consideration of panel 
reports. The first and second option in summary state: panel reports are 
automatically adopted sixty days after receipt, unless a disputant notifies 
the Contracting Parties of a decision to appeal or the Council decides not 
to adopt the report.175  The third option dictates a deadline of 45 days after 
receipt of the panel report for the Council to discuss it, and requires 
disputants to notify the Chairman of the appellate body and the Council 
within ten days after the Council's meeting of a decision to appeal.176  The 
final option maintains the consensus decisional model.  
A standing appellate body, comprised of three to five members and 
four alternates or seven members sitting in three member units, hears 
appeals of panel reports.177 Members, chosen by the Council, serve for 
three year terms, must posses expertise in GATT matters, be unaffiliated 
with any government, and represent divergent backgrounds in law and 
international trade.178  Appellate consideration and decision occurs within 
a maximum of sixty day after notice of appeal.179 
                                                 
171 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. (parties may express their view upon panel report). 
176 Id. (no notice of appeal results in report's automatic acceptance). 
177 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
                     Vol. 2 [2003]               SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65  
                                                        www.scu.edu/scjil 
The procedures for appellate review are left to the appellate body 
to draft, and for the Council to approve.180  The proceedings of the body 
are confidential, no ex parte communications are permitted, and only 
disputants may participate in the proceedings.181  Legal issues raised in the 
panel proceeding or in the panel report circumscribe the scope of the 
appeal, and the body may modify, reverse, or uphold such legal findings 
made by the panel.182  Disputants agree unconditionally in advance of the 
body's decision to its binding effect.183  
Four options govern adoption of the appellate body's decision. 
Options one and two are substantially similar, recommending the decision 
as the final disposition of the case unless the Council decides not to accept 
the decision.184  The third option announces the decision as final and 
unconditionally accepted, subject to the expression of any views by a 
contracting party.185  The fourth option adopts the consensus decision 
approach.186  
The implementation of Contracting Parties' recommendations 
occurs by informing the Council of implementation of rulings.187  Such a 
party has thirty to ninety days to implement the recommendations if 
mutually agreed.188  Lacking agreement, arbitration within sixty to one 
hundred and twenty days decides the compliance time.189  
Utilization of compensation and retaliation as a tool of 
enforcement is sanctioned in the draft agreement to encourage compliance 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 Id. (disputants maintain sole right to appeal). 
182 Id. 
183 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. 
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with recommendations and rulings of the Contracting Parties.190  Two 
options submit alternate procedures implementing compensation: (1) 
making compensation voluntary and subject to negotiations; or (2) at the 
expiration of a reasonable time disputants enter into negations to assure a 
mutually acceptable compensation package, with failure of these 
negotiations resulting in suspension of concessions.191 
Similarly, authorization for suspension of concessions or other 
obligations may result under four options.192  The first option follows a 
scheme of failed negotiations to reach mutually satisfactory compensation, 
resulting in the proposal of suspension measures proportional to the 
damage suffered to the Council.193  The Council automatically adopts the 
proposal with neither the disputants nor a third party allowed to block the 
measure.194  The second option sets out procedures applicable to serious 
failures to comply with recommendations justifying suspension of 
concessions.195 The third option requires notification to the Council of a 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 The draft text expressly prohibits unilateral action and requires national governments 
to ratify through legislation GATT dispute settlement procedures. Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. The procedures are:  
(a) The complaining party suspending concessions or other obligations shall notify the 
respondent party and the Council immediately upon implementing any such suspension.  
(b) If the respondent notifies the Director-General within ten days of such suspension that 
it believes the amount of trade covered by the suspension is not substantially equivalent 
to the nullification or impairment, the matter shall immediately be referred [back to the 
original panel] [to an arbitrator appointed by the Director-General] to determine a 
substantially equivalent amount. [If any member of the original panel is unable to serve, 
he or she shall be replaced by a member of the appellate body designated by the Director-
General.]  
(c) The parties shall provide written submissions to the [panel] [arbitrator] within ten 
days, and within ten days thereafter shall present oral argument to the [panel] [arbitrator]. 
The [panel] [arbitrator] shall not examine the nature of the concessions or other 
obligations to be suspended, but shall determine what amount of trade is substantially 
equivalent to the amount of nullification or impairment.  
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disputant's intention to suspend concessions or obligations, authorizing the 
action unless the Council rejects the course of action.196  The fourth option 
permits suspension of obligations or concession, temporarily, after a 
reasonable time in which the disputant fails to comply with 
recommendations.197  
Third parties are granted the right to receive parties' submissions 
and be present at the first meeting of the panel. Believing a trade measure 
already subject to panel process nullifies or impairs a third party's GATT 
benefits, a third party may resort to a separate panel process.198  The 
original panel hearing the dispute involving the same measure shall 
reconstitute to adjudge the third party matter under expedited 
procedures.199 
Least-developed countries received special dispute settlement 
procedures in the draft text. If consultations fail, then the Director-General 
may offer good offices to settle the dispute before request for a panel.200  
The draft text suggests the creation of the “Group of Five,” as a separate 
body for the settlement of disputes involving least-developed nations.201 If 
a panel deliberates on a dispute involving a least-developed nation, then 
                                                                                                                         
(d) The [panel] [arbitrator] shall complete its work and issue its determination within x 
days, unless the parties, in consultation with the panel, agree to a longer period. The 
parties must accept the [panel's] [arbitrator's] determination as final.  
(e) If the [panel] [arbitrator] determines that the amount of the suspension of concessions 
or other obligations is not substantially equivalent to the amount of nullification or 
impairment, the suspending party shall immediately adjust the amount of the suspension 
to comply with the [panel's] [arbitrator's] determination. Id. 
196 Id. (explaining that objection to suspension referred to binding arbitration calculates 
the amount of nullification or impairment within three months). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. (requiring least developed 
country to request good offices). 
201 Id. The Group consists of the Chairmen of: the Contracting Parties; the Council; the 
Sub-Committee on the Trade of Least-Developed Countries; and the Director-General of 
the GATT. Id. 
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the report of the panel must indicate explicit consideration and execution 
of GATT provisions on differential and more-favorable treatment.202  
Lastly, the draft text authorizes the employ of arbitration under the 
same procedures utilized by panel process.203 The Council discusses the 
arbitration, its award, and monitors implementation of the award under the 
same procedures applicable to adopted reports.204  The arbitration award 
does not bind third parties.205 
 
II. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 
For the purposes of this work description of certain relevant 
provisions of the 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) suffices to provide a backdrop for a 
discussion of the various governmental proposals to reform the DSU. The 
original “Dunkel Draft” comprised twenty one single spaced pages 
divided into twenty five sections and one hundred and twenty three 
separate paragraphs with a two page annex on procedures.206  The final 
Understanding encompasses twenty seven articles and four appendixes. 
Hence, the DSU represents the most comprehensive single instrument 
dictating procedures and creating institutions in GATT history.  
The major features of the DSU are its application to a majority of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes, creation of a Dispute 
Settlement Body as a special session of the Members (formerly 
                                                 
202 Id. 
203 Id. (allowing for agreements to the contrary). 
204 Id. (stating that arbitration expenses be paid by GATT if held at GATT headquarters, 
and the award be consistent with GATT and international law). 
205 GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. 
206 See GATT Director-General, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations MTN.TNC/W/FA (December 20, 1991) (draft 
named after Arthur Dunkel then GATT Director-General); Secretariat, URUGUAY 
ROUND - TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE - LEGAL DRAFTING GROUP - 
MEETING OF 5 - 7 FEBRUARY 1992, MTN.TNC/LD/2 (February 18, 1992). 
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Contracting Parties), constitution of a permanent Appellate Body, and 
special procedures relating to non-violation complaints in GATT 1994 
Art. XXIII:1(b) and 1(c).207  The Dispute Settlement Body oversees the 
process of resolving conflict by establishing panels, adopting panel and 
Appellate Body reports by consensus with disputants present, and 
authorizes suspension of concessions or obligations under the new WTO 
charter.208  The Appellate Body consists of seven members sitting in three 
member panels to hear appeals from panel decisions.209  Appeal is limited 
to legal issues and interpretations made by the panel, and binding upon the 
disputant unless the Dispute Settlement Body rejects the decision within 
thirty days following promulgation among the Members.210  Regarding 
non-violation complaints under GATT 1994 Art. XXIII:1(b), the DSU 
procedures apply differently in each case. In the case of a non-violation 
complaint, the DSU applies subject to four conditions altering the DSU's 
provisions.211  For complaints under GATT 1994 Art. XXIII:1(c) different 
procedures apply.212 
                                                 
207 The DSU also sets out special provisions dealing with least-developed Members. 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Annex 2, art. 24, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 
I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU Agreement]. 
208 Id. at art. 2. 
209 Id. at art. 17(1). 
210 Id. at art. 17(14). 
211 The special non-violation conditions are:  
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint 
relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement;  
(b) where a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under, or impede the 
attainment of objectives, of the relevant covered agreement without violation thereof, 
there is no obligation to withdraw the measure. However, in such cases, the panel or the 
Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a mutually 
satisfactory adjustment;  
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21, the arbitration provided for in 
paragraph 3 of Article 21, upon request of either party, may include a determination of 
the level of benefits which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways 
and means of reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment; such suggestions shall not be 
binding upon the parties to the dispute;  
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Consultation begins the dispute resolution process, with a written 
request submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body stating the reasons for 
the request, identification of the trade measures in issue, and a statement 
of the legal basis for the complaint.213  The time frame for beginning a 
consultation is within ten days of receipt of a request, and consultations 
extend to sixty days after a request.214  Expedited timeframes govern 
urgent cases, and third party Members may join in a consultation upon a 
showing of a substantial trade interest in the ongoing consultations.215  
Developing Members' particular problems and interests should be 
accorded due regard in consultations involving such Members.216 
Other diplomatic solutions receive a gloss in the DSU. These 
include good offices, conciliation, and mediation.217  Particularly, 
disputants may agree to continue these diplomatic solutions during the 
panel process, and the Director-General may offer each of these resolution 
systems to the disputants ex offico.218 
The panel process of the DSU adopted the ideas of the 1990 Draft 
Text. Written requests setting out the scope of consultations, the measures 
                                                                                                                         
(d) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 22, compensation may be 
part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute. Id. at art. 
26(1)(a)-(d).  
212 The dispute settlement rules and procedures contained in the 1989 Decision apply to 
consideration for adoption, and surveillance and implementation of recommendations and 
rulings. Id. at art. 26(2). Additional procedures applicable solely to an Art. XXIII:1(c) 
complaint are:  
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any argument 
made with respect to issues covered under this paragraph;  
(b) in cases involving matters covered by this paragraph, if a panel finds that cases also 
involve dispute settlement matters other than those covered by this paragraph, the panel 
shall circulate a report to the DSB addressing any such matters and a separate report on 
matters falling under this paragraph. DSU Agreement art. 26(2)(a)-(b). 
213 Id. at art. 4(4). 
214 Id. at art. 4(3), (7). 
215 Id. at art. 4(8), (9), (11). 
216 Id. at art. 4(10) (encouraging special consideration for developing countries). 
217 See id. at art. 5. 
218 DSU Agreement art. 5(5), (6). 
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at issue, and the legal basis for the complaint, as well as either standard 
terms of reference or proposed special terms of reference begin the panel 
process.219  Panel composition remains open to governmental and non-
governmental individuals chosen from a list kept by the Secretariat.220  
The Secretariat proposes panelist nominations, which a disputant may 
challenge for compelling reasons.221  In a dispute involving a developing 
and developed Member at least one panelist must be from a developing 
nation.222 
A panel functions under a codified set of working procedures, 
unless the disputants agree otherwise.223 The panel process commences 
and ends within six months of a request for panel process, but may extend 
to a maximum of nine months if a panel requests additional time to 
prepare its report and conduct its examination.224  Yet, a complaining 
party may suspend the panel process for up to twelve months.225 
Additionally, the panel releases to the disputants the facts and argument 
sections of their report for an interim review process.226  Such a process 
allows written and oral arguments to the panel, which are noted and 
included in the panel's final report.227 Adoption of the final report by the 
Dispute Settlement Body occurs within sixty days after its circulation to 
                                                 
219 Id. at arts. 6(2), 7. 
220 Id. at art. 8(1), (4) (requiring panelists that are still well qualified and independent). 
221 Id. at art. 8(6). 
222 Id. at art. 8(10); id. at art. 9 (explaining procedure on multiple complaints); DSU 
Agreement art. 10 (describing third party access to panel process). 
223 Id. at art. 12; DSU Agreement app. 3. 
224 DSU Agreement art. 12(8), (9). 
225 Id. at art. 12(12). 
226 Id. at art. 15(1) (describing process). 
227 Id. at art. 15(3). 
Vol. 2 [2003] RESOLVING TRADE DISPUTES 72 
 Daniel H. Erskine 
 
the Members, unless notice of an appeal or a consensus of the Dispute 
Settlement Body decides not to adopt the report.228  
The DSU institutionalizes the standing Appellate Body with a 
membership of recognized authorities in the fields of law, international 
trade, and subjects covered in other WTO agreements appointed by the 
Dispute Settlement Body for four year terms with the possibility of 
reappoint to only one additional term.229  These individuals are 
unaffiliated with any government, representative of the WTO membership, 
and recluse themselves from decision of a dispute creating a conflict of 
interest.230 
The appellate process commences when a disputant notifies the 
Dispute Settlement Body of its desire to appeal the panel report. The 
Appellate Body hears appeals only from disputants, not third parties, and 
should complete its process in sixty days.231 An additional thirty days may 
be requested by the Appellate Body to produce its report.232 The Body 
addresses each issue raised on appeal, drafting its report anonymously and 
outside the presence of the disputants.233 The Body's working procedures 
result from consultation with the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement 
Body and the WTO Director-General.234 An appeal results in either a 
reversal, modification, or sustaining of the legal findings of the panel.235 
Appellate Body decisions are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body 
                                                 
228 Id. at art. 16(4) (altering process from original consensus to adopt GATT practice); see 
id. at art. 20 (allocating nine months for Dispute Settlement Body to decide if no appeal 
and twelve months if appeal). 
229 DSU Agreement art. 17(1), (2), (3) (providing that the Dispute Settlement Body fills 
vacancies that arise). 
230 Id. at art. 17(3). 
231 See id. at art. 17(4), (5). 
232 Id. at at 17(5). 
233 Id. at art. 17(10), (11), (12). 
234 Id. at art. 17(9). 
235 DSU Agreement art. 17(13). 
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within thirty days of its circulation to the Members, unless a consensus of 
the Members revokes the report.236 
The DSU sets out procedures for implementing the 
recommendation of the Dispute Settlement Body along with authorization 
for compensation and the suspension of concessions.237 Regarding 
implementation of recommendations, the Member must inform the 
Dispute Settlement Body of its actions taken to implement the 
recommendation, and if implementation is impracticable the Member has 
a reasonable time to comply.238 A dispute about a Member's compliance 
with recommendations results in resort to DSU procedures.239 Surveillance 
of compliance by the Dispute Settlement Body occurs through placement 
of the issue on the Body's agenda till compliance is achieved.240 
Compensation is voluntary, and suspension of concessions disfavored as a 
temporary measure. The Dispute Settlement Body assesses the level of 
suspension as equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment 
endured.241  Objection to the level of suspension imposed is resolved 
through arbitration.242  
Several issues have arisen under the DSU in application of its 
procedures and in the functioning of the system. Some commentators 
attack the entire scheme established by the DSU, while others see the DSU 
as economically inefficient.243  Other scholars compare the DSU to other 
                                                 
236 Id. at art. 17(14). 
237 See id. arts. 21, 22. 
238 Id. at art. 21(3). See id. at art. 21:2(a)-(c) (defining reasonable time period). 
239 Id. at art. 21(5). 
240 DSU Agreement art. 21(6). 
241 Id. at art 22(4). 
242 Id. at art. 22(6). 
243 See Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Agreement: 
An Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade Disputes , 2 Pepp. 
Disp. Resol. L.J. 99 (2002); Warren F. Swartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure 
of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization , 31 J. Legal 
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international dispute resolution systems with differing assessments of the 
effectiveness of DSU proceedings.244 
 
A. National Proposals for Change 
1 . European Communities  
The European Communities (EC) submitted the most far reaching 
proposal to reform the DSU.245  The EC seeks textual amendment to the 
DSU to authorize withdrawal of requests for consultations and panel 
process at any time, or in the case of panel process up until rending of a 
final panel report.246  The EU also seeks to create a system of permanent 
panelists, who would be appointed to a case by lottery and would hear 
                                                                                                                         
Stud. 179 (2002); Charles E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future 
of the World Trade Organization , 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 403 (2001). 
244 See Jeffery Michael Smith, Three Models of Judicial Institutions in International 
Organizations: The European Union, The United States, and The World Trade 
Organization, 10 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 115 (2002) (DSU potentially more effective 
than other systems); Maria Alejandra Rodriguez Lemmo, Study of Selected International 
Dispute Resolution Regimes, With An Analysis of the Decisions of the Court of Justice of 
the Andean Community, 19 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 863 (2002) (DSU most utilized 
international dispute system). See also Ruth Mackenzie and Philippe Sand, International 
Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. 
271 (2003) (raising questions of judicial impartiality and independence in international 
organizations like DSU). 
245 See Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/49 (Feb. 17, 2003), for Australia's proposal 
covering substantial amounts of DSU. 
246 Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities and its Member 
States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1 
(Mar. 13, 2002) (proposing eighteen month limit on implementation of consultations or 
request for panel should be deemed withdrawn) [hereinafter Contribution of the 
European Communities ]. See also Dispute Settlement Body, India's Questions to the 
European Communities and its Members States on Their Proposal Relating to 
Improvement of the DSU, TN/DS/W/5 (May 7, 2002) (submitting detailed questions 
concerning each aspect of EC proposal); The European Communities' Replies to India's 
Questions, TN/DS/W/7 (May 30, 2002) (submitting statistical data and extensive 
commentary on proposal). 
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cases in groups of three.247  The panelists would serve for staggered terms, 
and would be unaffiliated with any government.248 
The Appellate Body would be granted the power to remand a panel 
report back to the original panel for additional findings of fact or other 
proceedings that the Body might direct.249 Additionally, compliance with 
Dispute Settlement Body recommendations would be subject to the DSU's 
procedure.250  A disputant disagreeing with its compliance with a 
recommendation is permitted to request consultations followed by a panel 
and Appellate Body consideration.251  A “compliance panel,” consisting of 
the original panelists receives written submissions summarizing the legal 
basis of the complaint against the recommendations and specifically 
identifies the measures at issue.252  The Dispute Settlement Body retains 
the right to refuse, by consensus, establishment of a compliance panel.253 
Request for authorizations for suspension of concessions or other 
obligations under the WTO would be subject to a request for arbitration to 
adjudge the amount of nullification or impairment incurred as a result of 
the volatile measure.254  The arbitration would be conducted by the 
                                                 
247 Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246 (roster includes 20 
persons chosen by Director-General for six year terms). 
248 Id. (proposing that panelists be appointed for either three, four, five, or six year terms 
with an equal number appointed at each interval, and those appointed to three or four year 
terms would be eligible for reappointment to a six year term). 
249 Id.; Dispute Settlement Body, Jordan's Contributions Towards the Improvement and 
Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/43 (Jan. 28, 
2003) (submitting proposal that the Appellate Body be able to remand a case back to the 
panel or compliance panel, with directions for the panel, if the panel's report does not 
contain sufficient undisputed factual findings). 
250 Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246. 
251 Id. 
252 Id; Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities and its 
Member States to the Improvement and Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/38 ( Jan. 23, 2003 ). 
253 Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246. 
254 Id.; Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the Republic of Korea to the 
Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO , TN/DS/W/35 (Jan. 
22, 2003) (suggesting fast track option for determination of reasonable time to comply 
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original panelists.255  Failure to implement the arbitrator's award may 
result in further consultations to reach mutually acceptable trade 
compensation that in turn may lead to a request for authorization by the 
Dispute Settlement Body to suspend concession and obligations.256  A 
Member subject to suspension may request a withdrawal of authorization 
on the grounds of removal of the trade measure or dissipation of the 
nullification or impairment caused by the measure.257 
 
2. Canada  
Canada proposes a new annex to the WTO creating established 
procedures to protect business' confidential information produced during 
panel or arbitration proceedings.258  Such information would be subject to 
an agreement on nondisclosure limited to disputants, panelists, Secretariat 
staff, and experts appointed by the panel.259 After conclusion of the 
proceeding such information would be destroyed or returned.260 
                                                                                                                         
with Dispute Settlement Body recommendation); Dispute Settlement Body, Amendment 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
TN/DS/W/32 (Jan. 22, 2003)(Japan); Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on 
Improvements and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding , TN/DS/W/22 
(Oct. 28, 2002) (Japan's resubmitted proposal joined by thirteen countries on issue 
previously tabled). But see Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and 
Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/26 (Nov. 26, 2002) 
(Ecuador's differing proposal) [hereinafter DSU Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 
26, 2002]; Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvement and Clarifications of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding , TN/DS/W/33 (Jan. 23, 2003) (another 
Ecuadorian proposal). 
255 Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246. 
256 Id. (proposing that request is accepted unless consensus of Dispute Settlement Body 
rejects request). If the Member subject to suspension objects to the level of suspension or 
breach of procedures, then an arbitration results. Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of Canada to the Improvement of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/41 ( Jan. 24, 2003 ) (offering draft annex 
and procedure texts) [hereinafter Contribution of Canada]. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
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Another proposal focuses on establishment of a new panel 
roster.261  Members nominate one person with expertise in GATT, 
international trade, and law who is either a Member's national or not.262  A 
statement of the individual's qualifications outlining her capacity to serve 
as a panelist would be forwarded by the nominating Member to a 
committee composed of the Chairmen of the General Council, Dispute 
Settlement Body, and the Goods, Services, and Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property councils.263  The committee evaluates the individual's 
qualifications to ascertain they meet the standard of expertise necessary to 
serve on a panel.264  After the committee completes its evaluation, those 
individuals approved by the committee are forwarded to the General 
Council for ratification.265  Ratified individuals serve on the roster for five 
years with a chance to serve only one additional five year term upon the 
General Council's approval.266  Panelists chosen from the roster by the 
Secretariat may also be supplemented by propositions by the disputants for 
panel service.267  The Director-General, finding insufficient expertise 
available on the roster to handle a particular issue, may place upon the 
panel a non-roster person.268 
Written submissions by disputants and third parties to panel and 
Appellate Body proceedings should be made public at the time of 
submission by the Secretariat and available through a public registry.269  
                                                 
261 Id. (looking to rewrite DSU Agreement art. 8(4)). 
262 Id. (describing proposal to rewrite DSU Agreement art. 8(4)). 
263 Id. 
264 Contribution of Canada, supra note 258. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. (allowing substitution of nominee throughout process and Secretariat to maintain 
statements of qualifications for roster persons, which Members access). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. (redacting confidential information by disputant for public dissemination). Accord 
Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan , 
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Coordinately, panel and Appellate Body meetings shall be public and 
broadcast to the public.270  Yet, panel deliberations are confidential, and 
Appellate Body reports drafted out of the presence of third parties and 
disputants.271 
 
3. Mexico  
Mexico 's chief problem with the DSU is the length of time a WTO 
inconsistent measure remains in force without any sanction.272  The 
solution proposed grants authority to the panel to determine the level of 
nullification or impairment, which in turn is subject to the Appellate 
Body's affirmance, modification, or reversal.273  The Dispute Settlement 
Body could then authorize suspension of concessions and benefits upon 
adoption of the report.274 
Mexico also suggests compensation be based on retroactive 
assessment of nullification or impairment, rather then the current 
prospective determination.275  Further, Mexico advocates for the use of 
preventative measures in extreme instances where the trade measure 
                                                                                                                         
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Doha Mandated Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/25 ( Nov. 27, 2002 ). 
270 Contribution of Canada , supra note 258 (proposing that confidential information 
portions of proceeding not be subject to public broadcast). 
271 Id. 
272 Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations of Improvements and Clarifications of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter DSU 
Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 4, 2002]; Dispute Settlement Body, Amendments 
to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
Proposed Text By Mexico, TN/DS/W/40 (Jan. 27, 2003). 
273 DSU Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 4, 2002 (explaining that determination 
could remain confidential until circulation of Appellate Body report with panel 
modifying its opinion on level as a result). See Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of 
Ecuador to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO , 
TN/DS/W/9 (July 8, 2002) (discussing similar problem); DSU Improvements and 
Clarifications Nov. 26, 2002, supra note 254. (describing Ecuador 's differing proposal). 
274 DSU Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 4, 2002, supra note 272. 
275 Id. 
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causes significant damage to a Member.276  Additionally, the Mexicans 
propose the right to suspend concessions be negotiable, permitting a 
complaining party to bargain with a third party Member to transfer its 
right to suspend in exchange for a trade benefit from the third party 
Member.277 
 
4. Chile and the United States  
A joint proposal by these two nations calls for submission of 
interim reports by the Appellate Body for disputants to strengthen the final 
report by their commentary.278  Included in the prior proposal is the right 
of disputants to delete, by mutual agreement, those findings in the report 
that are unhelpful in resolving the dispute.279  Similarly, the Dispute 
Settlement Body could partially adopt reports to implement only those 
portions of a report helpful to resolve a dispute.280 
A further proposal calls for a right of disputants to, by mutual 
agreement, suspend panel or Appellate Body procedures.281  Both 
countries emphasize the need for well qualified expert panelists to hear a 
dispute, as well as the need for interpretative rules governing WTO 
agreements.282  Also, both nations perceive a need to provide additional 
                                                 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarification of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO 
Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/W/52 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter DSU Flexibility and 
Member Control]. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. See Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of Brazil to the Improvement of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/45/Rev.1 (Mar. 4, 2003) (proposing 
a fast track option for measure already found inconsistent with WTO obligations by 
previous panel or Appellate Body new panel with original members for expedited 
procedure). 
282 DSU Flexibility and Member Control, supra note 278; Dispute Settlement Body, 
Negotiation on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
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guidance to WTO dispute settlement bodies on the nature and task present 
for resolution.283 
 
5. Proposals effecting developing and least-developed nations  
China urged reformation of the special and differential provisions 
applicable to developing members in the DSU.284  Among China 's 
proposals are restraints of developed nations against developing nations in 
utilizing the DSU to prosecute cases against a developing nation.285  If a 
developed Member brings a complaint against a developing Member, and 
the challenged measure survives the complaint (not volatile of WTO 
provisions), then the legal costs of the developing Member are paid by the 
developed Member who initiated the proceedings.286  Finally, China seeks 
mandatory “technical assistance and capacity building” from developed 
countries so developing Members may effectively utilize the DSU.287 
 One group of countries suggests conflicts between developed and 
developing Members that remain unresolved through failure of the 
developed Member to implement Dispute Settlement Body 
recommendations should be settled by resort to suspension of concessions 
and benefits with respect to “any and all [trade] sectors under any covered 
                                                                                                                         
on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/W/28 
(Dec. 23, 2002) (Chile and United States original proposal). 
283 DSU Flexibility and Member Control, supra note 278. 
284 Dispute Settlement Body, Improving the Special and Differential Provision in the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/29 ( Jan. 22, 2003 ) [hereinafter DSU 
Special and Differential Provision]. See Dispute Settlement Body, Specific Amendments 
to the Dispute Settlement Understanding—Drafting Inputs from China, TN/DS/W/51 
(Mar. 5, 2003); Dispute Settlement Body, Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding—Drafting Inputs from China, TN/DS/W/51/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 2003). 
285 DSU Special and Differential Provision, supra note 284. (limiting the number to two 
cases per year brought by a developed country Member against a developing country 
Member). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
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agreements.288  Another group, called the least-developed group, calls for 
specific textual amendments to the DSU to recognize and account for 
difficulties faced by least-developed nations.289  Particularly, during the 
consultation process, Members should consider and give special attention 
to the problems and interests of both developing and least-developed 
Members.290  In the panel process, a least-developed nation should be 
permitted to request an additional least-developed panelist to serve with 
the one appointed to the panel by DSU procedure.291  The group also 
supports mandatory compensation for violation of the WTO treaty 
provisions, and automatic collective retaliation against developed 
Members noncompliant with Dispute Settlement Body recommendations 
in disputes involving a least-developed Member and developed 
Member.292 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Surveying ideas for an international regime to solve trade disputes, 
the problem appears to lie within the desire for enforceable determinations 
                                                 
288 See Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiation on the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, TN/DS/W/19 ( Oct. 9, 
2002 ), for proposal by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe. 
289 Id. See Dispute Settlement Body, Text for LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/37 ( January 22, 2003 ), for Haiti 's 
communication. See Dispute Settlement Body, Text for the African Group Proposals on 
Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/42 ( Jan. 24, 2003 ) 
(proposing significant textual amendment to reflect consideration of developing 
countries' issues by Kenya). See Dispute Settlement Body, Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Proposals: Legal Text, TN/DS/W/47 (Feb. 11, 2003) (proposing textual 
changes reflecting mandatory consideration of developing nations' interests by India on 
behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, and Malaysia). 
290 Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
TN/DS/W/17 ( Oct. 9, 2002 ). 
291 Id. (guaranteeing same right to least-developed country as developing country has, but 
expanding both by allowing request for an additional panelist representative of their 
respective status as developed or least-developed). 
292 Id. 
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by competent impartial bodies to bind sovereign nations. Treaty 
instruments are voluntarily entered into and may be withdrawn from 
equally as easily. Heretofore, there has never existed an international 
regime resembling a supranational government of which all nations enter 
into and remain bound to without the possibility of withdrawal. 
Unfortunately, as the various proposals and instruments discussed above 
evidence, there exists a need in the realm of international trade for 
predictable enforceable judgments. 
The need for judicial-type settlement of complaints directly 
opposes the essence of a treaty regime, where consent and not judgment 
governs actions by international organizations. Perhaps the task at hand is 
too great an undertaking for the many nations of the world. In attempting 
to garner free trade, sovereignty and national interest get in the way. An 
effective dispute resolution system must understand and confront these 
key issues.  
In formulating such a system, resort to diplomatic tactics proves 
inefficient. More sophisticated systems are time-consuming. Disputes just 
do not resolve themselves, and so the current system balances the former 
considerations by providing procedural guidance and institutional 
structure. Yet, a system emphasizing speed and ingenuity could provide a 
better result than the current settlement scheme. Such a system could bring 
the disputants together for organized negotiation presided over by a 
neutral. This neutral would guide the process toward settlement. If 
resolution were not achieved quickly, then the neutral turns decision-
maker. He makes a determination of how the dispute should resolve itself. 
That determination could then be put before a group of three trade experts 
for conformation. If the determination is not confirmed, then the 
disputants could resort to a mini-trial process. This process would be an 
abbreviated presentation of the facts and legal arguments by both sides. 
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Here an institutionalized judiciary could decide the matter. Their decision 
would be final. On the other hand, if conformation resulted from the initial 
determination, then the determination would govern the dispute.  
The process is simple, and grants finality to a dispute. Members 
who do not agree with the decision might be able to take their case directly 
to the other Members. In such a proceeding the Members representatives 
would meet as jury. Presentations and arguments could be made by the 
disputants on a limited time table. Decision rests with a two thirds 
majority as to whether an infraction of the treaty resulted from the 
measure. Remedy of the dispute would come in the form of mandatory 
withdrawal of the offending measure. No compensation or suspension of 
concessions would result. Noncompliance with such a determination 
would result in loss of membership in the organization for a limited 
period. Extension of that time or permanent expulsion would be possible if 
the offending measure remained in force past the limited period. Here the 
penalty for noncompliance is the same for every member.  
Introduction of such an approach is unlikely, but its ideas and 
simplicity might encourage others to rationalize the dispute settlement 
process within the realm of international trade differently. If accountability 
is necessary for free trade, then an organization's commitment to that goal 
must rest upon a fair dispute settlement technique. Ease of use mitigates 
toward greater utilization of the process, and eliminates the need for 
complex enforcement mechanisms.  
 
